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The nature/artifice dualism and the end of nature 
The relation between humanity and nature has been a thorny 
philosophical problem at least since the Greeks made the distinction 
between what emerges out of its own process, phusis or nature, and 
what is produced by another, techne or artifice. The persistence of this 
nature/artifice distinction in the sphere of environmental ethics has not 
only failed to resolve it but, in certain respects, has even exacerbated it 
by turning it into a hard and fast dualism. Such a nature/artifice dualism 
is defended in Robert Elliot’s essay “Faking Nature,”1 for instance, and 
is further maintained and defended in Eric Katz’s “The Big Lie: Human 
Restoration of Nature,”2 in which Katz asserts that “the imposition of 
human plans—human ideals, goals, and designs—converts natural 
processes into human artifacts. The natural environment cannot be 
redesigned or restored and remain natural.”3 The claim here is that any 
human intervention in nature transforms the latter into artifice and so, 
once this has occurred, ‘nature’ can never really be restored but will 
henceforth always be marked by that intervention. This thesis sets up an 
opposition between artifice and nature that renders the restoration of the 
latter impossible. Any restoration will only be an artifact since it is 
something produced by human intervention, and so it amounts to 
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‘faking nature’ in Elliott’s terms or, in Katz’s terms, merely the ‘big lie’ 
of replacing nature with artifice and then pretending that the pristine 
natural state of the former has been restored. But, predictably enough, 
rather than bringing humanity back to nature this assumed 
nature/artifice dualism actually leads to the abandonment of nature 
altogether, even resulting in the announcement of “the end of nature” 
by some environmentalists. In a book appropriately entitled The End of 
Nature, Bill McKibben argued that there is no longer any ‘nature’ out 
there that is untouched by human intervention, and so what nature there 
is has already long been divested of its purely natural character. This 
situation leaves us with only an artificial environment.  
Stephen Vogel has called attention to the self-defeating character of this 
sort of dualism with respect to environmental activism. Since any 
activism at all is human intervention, at best environmental activism 
can only hope to ‘fake nature’ once again.4 This leaves us with a kind 
of environmental fatalism. Rejecting all such nostalgia for a lost natural 
purity, Vogel instead embraces it: “The ‘end of nature,’ it turns out, 
may be something that has always already occurred.”5 This acceptance 
in turn allows the full recognition of human involvement in nature and 
thereby also the action necessary to ensure its preservation rather than 
destruction.  
But Vogel cautions us that if we reject the nature/artifice distinction we 
run the risk of landing in an environmental relativism: if  
all landscapes are already “artificial” (humanized) ones, then there seems 
to be no way to distinguish in a principled manner between the blighted 
landscapes of modern technology and the sorts that environmentalists 
typically want to preserve and indeed to protect against further 
technologization.6  
On the other hand, the charge of idealism is laid at the feet of social 
constructivists “because the claim that we somehow ‘construct’ our 
own environment seems simply to ignore the fact that nature is 
absolutely real and not a possible object of our construction at all.”7
In the end, Vogel advocates a kind of ethic of self-awareness, 
suggesting that acknowledging the social character of one’s practices 
and thereby “knowing oneself” is better than remaining unaware of it. 
Thus human actions are evaluated according to “the degree of self-
consciousness they evince.”
  
8 But without supplementing this account 
with a moral philosophy it is difficult to see why one ought to prefer 
such self-consciousness over a satiated ignorance or, on the darker side, 
why one should not become thoroughly self-conscious by openly 
acknowledging the social character of one’s practices while engaging in 
environmental destruction for the sake of technological progress or 
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market consumption. If we rely upon traditional anthropocentric moral 
systems, we might then be able to say that an awareness of how 
environmental destruction impacts certain human populations will 
provide the criteria for moral evaluation. Left with the “end of nature” 
without such an anthropocentric moral system, however, it is unclear 
how mere self awareness of the social character of one’s practices could 
in itself provide a moral criterion. Without falling back on well-worn 
anthropocentric moral systems, it is difficult to see how one could make 
a moral distinction between destroying and preserving natural 
environments insofar as both can equally be carried out in full self-
awareness.  
Environmental thought and activism has hereby come to an impasse in 
the ancient nature/artifice distinction. On the one hand, assuming a hard 
nature/artifice dualism leads to environmental fatalism, and on the other 
hand, rejecting the dualism in favour of artifice in an acknowledgment 
that all nature is now artifice, may lead to an environmental relativism 
in which we cannot make any ethical distinction between a natural 
ecosystem and an industrial refinery. Vogel’s ethic of self awareness 
fails to provide a genuinely moral criterion and so merely amounts to a 
strategy that, at best, might shame those who are destroying ecosystems 
by exposing their actions to a public that habitually accepts 
anthropocentric values. It is at the point when environmental thought 
confronts this impasse that I think Heidegger’s late ontology of ‘things’ 
becomes relevant.  
 
The ontology of things: The fourfold  
The series of essays concerning the ontology of “the fourfold” belong to 
the late thought of Martin Heidegger and together they sketch out his 
attempt to overcome the ontology of objective presence 
(Vorhandenheit) and to free things from the modern technological 
enclosure (Gestell) that frames them in advance as objects on hand and 
available for resource, data, reserve, etc. In Being and Time (1928), 
Heidegger had already been attentive to the importance of things. The 
account of spatiality provided there shows that “space” is more 
originally “place” and is articulated through things. It is through things 
that human existence is spatial. It is not that we first begin from an 
inner subjective sphere (a la Descartes) and from there go out to meet 
things in the world; rather, we are always already ‘outside’ among 
things,9 and humans tend to misunderstand what they are in terms of 
things. The representation of beings as objectively present (vorhanden), 
Heidegger argues, gets in the way of a more phenomenologically 
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clarified account of human existence in its everyday worldly 
involvements and thereby also covers over the phenomenon of “world” 
itself. A more phenomenologically clarified account of this world 
reveals that, before things appear as objectively present, they are 
manifest as implements or gear within a horizon of handiness 
(Zuhandenheit). It is only in a subsequent abstraction from this inner-
worldly involvement that they come to appear as objects with properties 
to cognitive reflection. But even the ontological horizon of handiness 
does not let the thing show itself from out of itself as a thing in its own 
right insofar as handiness is still determined by human existence in its 
worldly involvements and is thereby caught up in a totality of 
significations that do not, qua thing, necessarily belong to it. Indeed, 
this fact may also facilitate the impression that the abstraction of the 
thing from all involvements in the representation of it as an object with 
properties is what it actually is as a thing. But as a “deficient mode” of 
or abstraction from handiness, it too is merely a determination of 
human existence and fails to let the thing be manifest in its own terms.  
Thus Being and Time concludes by calling for a return to a 
phenomenology of things, since in the account of human everydayness 
they still did not really get a hearing. From the beginning of 
Heidegger’s philosophical trajectory, the “ontological difference” 
between Being and beings was invoked in order to avoid “reifying” 
Being—that is, to avoid representing Being as itself a being. Husserl 
before him had been concerned to avoid reifying consciousness. The 
verb to reify is derived from the Latin word for “thing” (res). It literally 
means to “thingify,” that is, to conceptually represent as a thing. But 
Heidegger points out that it is precisely the “thing” that should be put in 
question here. The concern to avoid reification itself already assumes a 
concept of the thing that has not been critically examined, and so 
Heidegger indicates the necessity of this examination. What is this 
“thing” that we are so concerned to avoid? This question is particularly 
acute for Heidegger given the fact that the analysis provided in Being 
and Time of human existence as a being-in-the-world showed that 
existence to be inextricably bound up with things in the midst of which 
it exists. If humans tend to misunderstand themselves in terms of 
things—viz., as objectively present objects—then it is likely that not 
only human beings but also things are misunderstood. Thus Heidegger 
asks, “Why is being ‘initially’ ‘conceived’ in terms of what is 
objectively present, and not in terms of things at hand that do, after all, 
lie still nearer to us?”10
Attention to handy implements returns again in the 1935 lecture The 
Origin of the Work of Art, where above and beyond Being and Time’s 
overriding concern with their projection onto a horizon of serviceability 
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within a framework of everyday worldly involvements, a more 
ontologically clarified level of their phenomenality is found in the 
reliability they offer. Although this notion may seem irrelevant when 
considering many of today’s mass-produced disposable commodities, 
one certainly appreciates reliability when it comes to essential items for 
our work and livelihood—such as a reliable automobile that doesn’t 
leave one stranded, or a coat that consistently keeps one warm through 
the winters. But nonetheless, reliability once again comes down to 
human concerns even if this notion carries a greater sense of the 
integrity of things than the everyday context of worldly involvement 
with mere handiness otherwise might admit.  
In 1935–36 Heidegger held a lecture course entitled “Basic Questions 
of Metaphysics.” Since this lecture was a sustained philosophical 
analysis of the being of “the thing” per se, focusing especially upon its 
modern form in Kant’s philosophy, it was subsequently published under 
the title What Is a Thing? 11 The section that concerns us most here is 
the one that attempts to reveal the essential differences between the 
experience of the thing as it shows itself in Aristotelian philosophy on 
the one hand as opposed to the ways Galileo and Newton conceived of 
it on the other hand, the latter providing a segue into an account of why 
Descartes had to ground things in the being of the subject as a res 
cogitans (thinking thing).12 According to Heidegger’s account, when 
we place Galileo’s conception of nature as natura against the earlier 
Aristotelian thought of nature as phusis one can discern all the essential 
features of the modernist representation of nature, a representation 
Heidegger calls the “mathematical project” and which subsequently 
receives a more explicit articulation in Newton’s famous “principle of 
inertia.” In this modern representation, “the concept of nature in general 
changes”: 
Nature is no longer the inner principle out of which the motion of the 
body follows; rather, nature is the mode of the variety of the changing 
relative positions of bodies, the manner in which they are present in space 
and time, which themselves are domains of possible positional orders and 
determinations of order and have no special traits anywhere.13 
Because nature is now understood this way, quantifiability becomes a 
demand and nature is now constrained to show itself according to 
quantifiable relations. Hence Galileo held that the universe itself is 
written in the language of mathematics,14 and Descartes asserted that 
the only acceptable principles in physics are those of mathematics and 
geometry.15
Heidegger’s final point about this transformation in the understanding 
of nature from phusis to natura is that the manner of questioning nature 
changes. It becomes less a matter of attending to what shows itself in 
 The “mathematical” henceforth takes on a pivotal role.  
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beings after the Aristotelian mode and more of a demand or 
interrogation put to nature. According to Heidegger, this interrogative 
mode is demanded by the way beings as a whole are now showing 
themselves in the modern post-seventeenth-century world. Furthermore, 
it paves the way for what Heidegger considers to be the essence of 
modern technology—that “totalizing framework” (Gestell) which for 
Heidegger is not just an instrumental means to an end but is a way of 
revealing things in the modern era. As the translators of What Is a 
Thing? point out, this interrogative mode and its projective character is 
perhaps best illustrated in Kant’s assertion about early modern scientists 
like Galileo, Torricelli, and Stahl:  
They learned that reason only gains insight into what it produces itself 
according to its own projects; that it must go before with principles of 
judgment according to constant laws, and constrain nature to reply to its 
questions, not content to merely follow her leading-strings.16 
In the mathematical project Heidegger asserts that, as opposed to the 
Aristotelian account in which natural bodies had a telos or an inner 
goal-oriented impetus, what now constitutes a natural body has no 
hidden interior: “Bodies have no concealed qualities, powers, and 
capacities. Natural bodies are now only what they show themselves as, 
within this projected realm.”17 
Things are now nothing more than what they show themselves to be. 
Given Heidegger’s own emphasis on the verb “to show,” this statement 
might at first seem odd since Heidegger’s entire point of departure had 
been the phenomenological method that attempts to articulate the way 
things show themselves. Wouldn’t the mathematical project then be a 
phenomenological godsend, finally opening up and disclosing the thing 
in such a way that nothing any longer remains hidden? But in a 1929/30 
lecture course18 Heidegger had made it clear that what is at stake is not 
the openness of the clearing per se—not disclosure itself—but rather 
the concealment or closedness that first makes unconcealment or 
disclosure possible. It is in the face of the closed refusal of beings that 
thrusts itself forward in moods like profound boredom or anxiety that 
human existence first comes before itself as possibility—not this or that 
particular possibility but, in the refusal of all possibilities, human 
existence is explicitly revealed as possibility per se. Giorgio 
Agamben’s reading of the 1929/30 lecture course suggests that the 
point at which human existence is most properly human (eigentlich) is 
also the point of the closest proximity with animal life—an openness to 
a closedness.19 I will return to this 1929/30 lecture course below in 
order to discuss this proximity in greater detail. 
The Trumpeter 8 
However, if “closedness” or the withdrawing of being into concealment 
is the crucial point at which the possibility of truth as such is first 
opened, then the elimination of all closedness in the mathematical 
project does not indicate what things are as such, but rather how things 
are manifest within that project. Phenomenologically speaking, things 
are manifest in the mathematical project as nothing more than what 
they show themselves to be in its terms. But it can readily be seen that 
such a mode of disclosure presents a profound challenge to any attempt 
to thinking about things outside of this horizon insofar as, in its 
banishment of any and all closedness, it mitigates against any other 
possibility of disclosure. Things are just this and nothing more.  
There is an irony in this banishment of all closedness, an irony to which 
our attention is perhaps called by Heidegger’s emphasis on the verb “to 
show”: it is in this seemingly innocent “nothing more” that Heidegger 
had earlier located that very closedness—the “nothing” upon which the 
very manifestation of beings as “just this” depends.20 It is as if, in its 
exile, closedness now must collapse into the disclosure of the totality of 
things in the mathematical project and thereby appear as identical to 
this disclosure. The very disclosure of beings in the mathematical 
project is thus itself a closedness that refuses any possibility outside its 
own horizon. Hence its stubborn insistence on being the only ‘real’ way 
of talking about things—when push comes to shove they are, after all, 
merely quantifiable objects with certain specifiable properties appearing 
within a homogeneous space of extension. The oft repeated 
Heideggerian formula of “oblivion of being” is thus an oblivion to 
closedness, to concealment.  
The kind of thinking that remains within the mathematical project is 
what Heidegger called “representational thinking.”21 What is meant by 
representational thinking? Heidegger claims that in the modern era all 
objectivity is “subjective,” not meaning “subjectivity” in the sense of 
the arbitrary opinion of an individual ego, but in the sense that “what 
encounters us comes to be established as an object standing in itself.”22 
This “establishing” is human reason establishing its own law for itself 
whereby it becomes the tribunal that “declares that in the future only 
what is placed before it in and through representation and is thus 
secured for it may be considered a being.”23
In the modern era, this representation takes on the form of a tribunal 
insofar as it makes itself its own law—reason gives to itself its own 
criteria and thereby determines what is. In striving to bring whatever is 
to count as a being under its law in such a way that it gives to itself the 
 Heidegger follows Kant in 
understanding “representation” to be a kind of apprehension that does 
not just passively take in what is given to it, but rather actively gives to 
itself what is present and what is to be present.  
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determinations of being, “the essence of subjectivity of itself 
necessarily surges toward absolute subjectivity”—viz., the 
understanding of subjectivity later articulated by the German idealists. 
This representation that strives toward the absolute wherein anything 
that is must first be given and determined through reason, not as 
something external to it but as its own self determination, is also “will” 
or “willful self-knowledge.” This in turn means that “reason is the 
absolute reality of the real, the Being of beings,” that is, Hegel’s 
“absolute spirit.”24  
Heidegger understands “representation” as that which “distinguishes 
what is represented in contrast to and for the one who is representing” 
and so for him, “representation is essentially this differentiating and 
dividing”25
Though Heidegger himself traces this development up to Hegel, we 
might also understand the contemporary ‘postmodern’ assumption of 
social constructivism to be itself merely another shape of the 
mathematical projection. Even though social constructivism replaces 
the Enlightenment idealism of reason with the empirically pragmatic 
concept of a social order based on material conditions, nonetheless this 
very cognitive move strives “to bring whatever is to count as a being 
under its law in such a way that it gives to itself the determinations of 
being.” In other words, at least in its most extreme form, social 
constructivism may be merely another mode of the mathematical 
project that brings all that exists under its representation and makes it 
appear there as just what this representation determines it to be and 
nothing more. In spite of the fact that it dispenses with the idea of a 
detached observer who can objectively measure quantifiable things, it 
remains “mathematical” in Heidegger’s sense—viz., in that it banishes 
all closedness as ‘mystification’ and makes everything appear in its 
terms, rather than in terms of the things themselves. Indeed, insofar as 
any and every notion of “the things themselves” is understood a priori 
to be constructed and hence posited by human beings, any gesture 
outside this representation is closed off in advance—once again 
underlining the fact that its very “disclosure” is itself a closedness that 
 that gives to itself the determinations of being. But this self-
giving and determining transpires within a thinking subject, and hence 
it must tacitly maintain the distinction between what is represented and 
the one representing—and hence it remains mired in the Cartesian 
subject/object framework. So, for Heidegger, the rise of the modern 
scientific representation of nature in Galileo goes hand in hand, 
ontologically speaking, with the Cartesian grounding of being in 
subjectivity—both transpire within that representational thinking 
characteristic of the mathematical projection.  
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conceals itself as such and eliminates any other possibility outside its 
representation.26  
Thus in spite of the title What Is a Thing?, the thing itself still has not 
been heard. This Heideggerian text merely shows how, in the context of 
the mathematical project and the representational thinking that remains 
within it, things have been made to appear in such a way that it seems 
to be the only way, or the only way that can be taken seriously. Hence, 
the phenomenological imperative that first gets phenomenology off the 
ground—Husserl’s motto “to the things themselves”—has not only not 
been fulfilled but can no longer even be heard.  
Heidegger henceforth became increasingly concerned with technology 
and how things appear from out of the “essence of technology,” leading 
him to the characterization of this essence as a mode of disclosure 
within which things are made to appear as “standing-reserve” 
(Bestand)—that is, as constantly on hand and available for 
manipulation, calculation, and consumption. But his concern about how 
things might show themselves in their own terms, irrespective of the 
essence of technology and the mathematical project, is a repeated theme 
throughout the Heideggerian corpus. After repeated gestures toward a 
phenomenology of things that always seemed to get sidetracked or 
taken up into other concerns—the analytic of human existence, the 
mathematical project, the account of things in Kantian philosophy, the 
artwork—Heidegger finally engages in a concerted attempt to address 
things qua things in a series of essays from the early 1950s on the 
“fourfold.”27
While these essays may well appear to be among the most ‘oracular’ of 
Heidegger’s work, they are nonetheless Heidegger’s attempt to 
overcome the ever dominant representation of things as objects within 
the mathematical project, a more superficial understanding of being that 
continually thrusts itself forward in every attempt to think at a more 
fundamental level, and to release things from the totalizing framework 
that reveals them as standing reserve. Although much has been made of 
this releasement (Gelassenheit) and even of the freedom implied in it,
 Here the part played by things is given its due. No longer 
are they merely handy in a context of everyday involvements, nor are 
they passively assembled by the artworks created and set up by human 
activity. Rather, in their phenomenality they condition us in certain 
ways, and this integrity is what Heidegger wants to think in the step 
back out of the representational thinking that demands in advance to be 
the master of whatever is to constitute an object for it.  
28 
not as much attention has been paid to the integral part played by things 
with respect to this releasement. Indeed, without things, there would be 
no freedom and no releasement. Likewise, much has been made of 
Ereignis as the “appropriative event” that opens up a world horizon, but 
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without Austrag—the carrying out of this opening up by the things that 
bear it—there is no Ereignis. And so the theme I want to invoke here 
and keep in view is Heidegger’s assertion about the relation of mortal 
human beings to things.  
We are—in the strict sense of the German word—the ones “be-thinged” or 
conditioned [die Be-dingten]. We have left the presumption of all 
unconditionedness behind us.29
At this point I will provide a brief exegesis of the lecture “Building 
Dwelling Thinking” paying special attention to the example of the 
bridge and with reference to the lecture “The Thing” as well, in order to 
fill out what how “things” might be understood beyond the 
metaphysical enclosure that represents them as quantifiable objects.
  
Heidegger hyphenates the German word for “conditioned” here as Be-
Dingten in order to highlight its literal sense of “be-thinged.” This does 
not, in a manner to be discussed below, indicate a mere passivity on our 
part. On the other hand, it obviously precludes the notion that we 
simply exercise an active power over things, determining them in 
advance as objects as in representational thinking.   
“Being” is an opening of unconcealment that makes beings manifest in 
certain ways, but now that opening is re-understood and rearticulated in 
terms of things. The ontological framework of “Being” that casts its net 
over the whole of beings will henceforth be relegated to that Western 
metaphysical oblivion which culminates in the essence of technology as 
a way of revealing the whole of beings as objects constantly on hand 
and available for inspection and calculation. In his phenomenological 
analyses of mortal dwelling and things, Heidegger attempts to release 
both of the latter from this metaphysical enclosure.  
30 
Heidegger’s most prominent examples are, in terms of the 
nature/artifice distinction, strictly artifacts—a bridge, ae jug, a peasant 
farmhouse. But not only does Heidegger suggest the possibility of also 
understanding things that are not artifacts outside that metaphysical 
enclosure, but his late ontology of things suspends the nature/artifice 
distinction per se, allowing us to conceive of things in such a way that 
this distinction is no longer the guiding determination. This means that 
we can also embrace the ‘end of nature’ along with Vogel, but with 
these stipulations: 1) we embrace the end of nature as natura within the 
mathematical project which determines in advance how all things must 
appear as objects within it, and 2) we also reject any Romantic project 
of a ‘return’ to nature. Rather, 3) the nature/artifice distinction in its 
entirety is suspended, which means that the ‘end of nature’ equally 
means the ‘end of artifice.’ This suspension in turn opens up new 
possibilities for environmental philosophy that are neither romantic 
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nostalgia for a lost nature nor a mere acknowledgment of human 
intervention in nature. In Heidegger’s late ontology of things, human 
beings are neither the masters and exploiters nor the bad guys who must 
be exiled from the garden.  
 
Building Dwelling Thinking 
Heidegger begins the essay “Building Dwelling Thinking,” which was 
actually first delivered as a lecture to a symposium on “Man and Space” 
in 1951, with an analysis of building. Insofar as buildings are primarily 
dwellings and only secondarily used for other things, this in turn leads 
him to an examination of what “dwelling” is.  
“Building Dwelling Thinking” is primarily concerned with those things 
that are built, although Heidegger also initially suggests that the 
“things” implied in dwelling can also be those that are cultivated. 
Things that are built and things that are cultivated may initially seem to 
be an unpromising point of departure for an attempt to articulate a non-
anthropocentric conception of things. However, the analysis of built 
things in “Building Dwelling Thinking” is one of the most concrete and 
accessible of Heidegger’s attempts to articulate this phenomenological 
account of things outside the mathematical project, and just as this 
account provides some indications of how we might also think of 
cultivated things, it is also provides some indications of how we might 
think of what we would otherwise call “natural” things—eagles, deer, 
mountains, rivers, and so on.31  
In these essays Heidegger understands human existence in terms of 
mortal dwelling, and “dwelling in the sense of the sojourn of mortals on 
the earth.”32 To dwell on the earth at the same time signifies “under the 
sky” and “with others”—others who can die and so are mortal as well. 
Heidegger also adds “remaining before the gods,” perhaps the most 
problematic member of the fourfold.33 The primal four: earth and sky, 
gods and mortals, “belong together in one.”34 Earth and sky is the 
region of regions—the original and ultimate spatial closure for human 
existence. The closure of a region is not merely its circumference, but is 
that which provides the definition of the region, its specific character 
and “atmosphere.” Thus the closure pervades throughout the entirety of 
the region it determines. The ultimate spatial region, 
phenomenologically speaking, is the horizon of earth and sky, and this 
horizon pervades every other region within it. Only within the context 
of this horizon are particular regions, locales, sites, and places 
themselves determined.  
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“Mortals dwell insofar as they save the earth.”35 “Saving” here means 
bringing a thing to its own most proper manner of appearance, that is, 
allowing it to show itself in its own terms irrespective of the 
mathematical project. Thus such saving “does not merely rescue 
something from a danger; to save properly signifies: to release 
something into its own proper manner of emergence.”36 In other words, 
saving is not merely reactive, acting against a threat, but above and 
beyond this it attends to the integrity of that which it wishes to save—
and only thereby truly saves it. Such “saving” may thereby indeed be a 
precondition of the environmentalist desire to “save” natural 
ecosystems, particularly if environmentalism takes upon itself the task 
of thinking and understanding that which it seeks to preserve. Any 
attempt to “save the earth” without a fundamental re-thinking will only 
appear within the mathematical project as a fanciful projection of 
subjective values onto a collection of indifferent objects that are 
valueless in themselves.  
Dwelling comes to pass when the four are each ‘released’ into their 
essential manner of appearance and thereby allowed to belong together 
in one. In this way, dwelling preserves the fourfold. But dwelling is 
always a dwelling alongside and among things. If it were not for things, 
“the fourfold” would be only an empty abstraction. Thus Heidegger 
writes: 
How do mortals accomplish their dwelling as this preserving? Mortals 
would never be capable of this if dwelling were only a residence on the 
earth, under the sky, before the divinities, with mortals. Rather, dwelling 
is always already a residence alongside things. Dwelling as preserving 
secures the fourfold in that with which mortals reside: in things.37 
Dwelling allows the four to be gathered together into one, and this 
gathering can only happen in things. It does not primarily happen as 
representations in our heads—we don’t imagine the four together in a 
neat mental picture. Rather, the four are concretely gathered together 
and brought into presence in and only in concrete things. 
The importance of things in Heidegger is not only often overlooked but, 
no doubt following the now-classic aversion to ‘reification,’ the thought 
of the “thing” is sometimes even made out to be the enemy. For 
instance, Damon Young claims the problem is that “Being, including 
the Being of humans, is understood as ‘things’,” and he claims to be 
“following Heidegger” in asserting that “this ‘thingly’ mentality is 
linked not only to ecocide, but to cultural commodification and the 
worst aspects of modern capitalism . . .”38 Likewise Shellenberger and 
Nordhaus assert that 
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Environmentalism is today more about protecting a supposed “thing”—
“the environment”—than advancing the worldview articulated by Sierra 
Club founder John Muir, who nearly a century ago observed, “When we 
try to pick out anything by itself, we find it hitched to everything else in 
the Universe.” Thinking of the environment as a “thing” has had 
enormous implications for how environmentalists conduct their politics.39  
Heidegger’s argument, however, is not that the thought of things is the 
problem. Rather, the problem lies in the lack of attention to things. The 
problem with the “thingly mentality” of commodification is that it does 
not attend to things at all. It is only when we attend to the 
phenomenality of things that we rejoin Muir in his observation that 
things are “hitched to everything else”—that is, to be a thing is to be a 
site of gathering or assembly.  
Heidegger immediately adds that “residing alongside things” is not an 
additional property or supplementary feature that has been subsequently 
introduced. If dwelling is accomplished through things, this means that 
things must be themselves released into their own manner of 
appearance—for according to Heidegger their manner of appearance 
consists precisely in this gathering of the four into one. Hence “things 
themselves secure the fourfold only when they themselves as things are 
released in their manner of appearance.”40
The phenomenology of the bridge provided in this text is one of 
Heidegger’s most well-known examples of his late ontology of things. 
The preparation for this ontology can already be seen in the earlier 
analysis of the Greek temple’s manner of appearance in The Origin of 
the Work of Art. It is no accident that Heidegger’s primary example of a 
work of art is a temple—a work of architecture that resists curatorial 
isolation as much as it resists the interpretation of art as a representation 
of something. The Greek temple is said to open up a region of 
unconcealment by simultaneously assembling and gathering within that 
region the beings that surround it—“tree and grass, eagle and bull, 
snake and cricket,” the storm that only “rages” when the temple opens 
up the space in which it can be manifest as the storm that it is.
 How are things “released” in 
this way? One way—one among other implied possibilities—is when 
mortals, in their dwelling, build things through cultivation and 
construction. This leads Heidegger to his discussion of the bridge as 




Heidegger writes that such a work “clears room”42 for a place in which 
the beings gathered around can then appear relative to it. Already the 
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reference to the whole of beings drops out and we are looking at things 
that are manifest in and through a localized place or region (Bereich)—
temple, sea, trees, eagles, and snakes.  
But what the later ontology of the fourfold shows us is that the work of 
art is not the only contributor to this disclosure—the things assembled 
around it make a contribution as well. The temple gathers eagle, cricket, 
and forest around itself, bringing them to appear in a certain way which 
they would not have otherwise, but the eagles, crickets, and forest also 
contribute to the disclosure of the temple. It is not a one-way relation. 
Indeed, this point is especially clear with respect to Greek temples—
one has only to see the Parthenon surrounded by city streets and the 
modern corporate buildings of Athens, with tourists taking snapshots 
from behind the closed off areas—as opposed to being surrounded by 
eagles and crickets—to get a sense of how the site and space of the 
temple region has undergone a dramatic modification. The artwork is 
still there, but the world it assembled necessarily included the things 
assembled, each with its own manner of gathering. 
As is usually the case in phenomenological inquiries, before 
approaching the examination of the bridge we must take special care to 
suspend our customary representations—especially the representation 
of beings in terms of objective presence. If we begin with the latter 
representation, or if we inadvertently smuggle it in somewhere along 
the way, we will invariably see everything Heidegger says about the 
bridge as something added to it by our own imaginations—added to an 
already determined ontology—and thereby fail to think at a properly 
ontological level at all. 
Heidegger’s phenomenological method entails embracing the well-
known “hermeneutical circle” in which we always already begin with a 
vague and general understanding of that which we are inquiring about 
prior to beginning the inquiry. The task of interpretation then is not to 
seek to avoid the circle but to enter into it and make the pre-theoretical 
and pre-objective understanding of being thematic. Heidegger’s text is a 
series of formal indications which the reader must then enact with 
respect to the matter of inquiry, and its legitimacy can only then be 
determined with respect to the disclosure (or lack thereof) of that matter 
of inquiry. In “Building Dwelling Thinking,” the first part of the essay 
lays the groundwork in its argument that building responds to dwelling, 
and dwelling in turn implies the fourfold. Now we are in a position to 
examine the concrete ways in which things might serve as sites of 
gathering for these “four world neighbours,” first bringing them into the 
mutual proximity of their belonging together. We can see a hint of the 
thing as a “gathering” already in the etymology of the word itself, 
etymology which Heidegger takes to be a trace left in language insofar 
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as at least one way that disclosure happens is through language. The 
English word “thing” shares its etymology with the German “Ding,” 
and signifies a gathering or assembly.  
As previously noted, at the very outset of Heidegger’s philosophical 
trajectory in Being and Time, he remarked that a return to the ontology 
of things would be necessary. In spite of the more fundamental manner 
of the disclosure of things determined there, the problem with that 
analysis is that the disclosure of things in terms of “handiness” depends 
upon the totality of significations that is the world of everyday 
involvements pertaining to human existence. That is, things themselves 
do not really contribute to this disclosure as such. Rather, they are taken 
up in a totality of significations that lies beyond them, and hence they 
are “projected” onto possibilities that become manifest within that 
worldly context.  
We get closer to a proper ontology of things per se in the Origin of the 
Work of Art, in which we begin to see the deficiencies of their 
disclosure as mere implements to be used and thereby used up. But here 
only those things that can be designated as artworks, along with 
implements or “equipment,” are explicitly discussed. Even in this 
context of artworks, however, it becomes apparent that the “workly” 
character of the work is not exactly the same as the “thingly” character 
of things, and so again the necessity is suggested of returning to this 
“thingly” element per se, attending to its own manner of appearance 
without reference to either implements or artworks: 
To determine the thing’s thingness, neither consideration of the bearer of 
properties, nor that of the manifold of sense data in their unity, and least 
of all that of the matter-form structure regarded by itself, which is derived 
from equipment, is adequate. Anticipating a meaningful and weighty 
interpretation of the thingly character of things, we must aim at the thing’s 
belonging to the earth.43
In Being and Time, the phenomenological analysis leads us to step back 
away from customary and habitual representations of beings within the 
ontological horizon of objective presence to the prior and more 
fundamental manner in which they appear in terms of worldly 
handiness. In the Origin, we again “step back”—this time from the 
everyday context of handiness to the more fundamental ground of that 
everyday world found in the strife between world and earth, a strife that 
is brought to presence in the work of art which thereby contributes to 
establishing the terms of phenomenality from which that world takes its 
  
In its ontological character—that is, according to the manner of 
appearance that most properly belongs to the thing qua thing, what 
exactly is a “thing”?  
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measure. Now in the late ontology of things, we step back once again 
from the strife between world and earth to the (perhaps ultimate) 
horizon of phenomenality: the gathering together of earth and sky, 
divinities and mortals. Just as the strife between world and earth is 
brought to a stand in the work and only thereby becomes a strife at all, 
so the fourfold are provided a site for their gathering in the thing. Only 
through things are earth, sky, divinities, and mortals brought forward in 
their belonging together and thereby become a “fourfold” at all.  
Heidegger takes this gathering to be the very concreteness of things—
that “thingly” element that has proved so elusive for philosophy yet is 
so close to us. As is often the case in philosophy, we find that what we 
habitually represent to ourselves as ‘concrete’—e.g., in this case the 
idea that things are objects with particular properties—turns out to be 
precisely what is an abstraction from the way things are manifest at the 
pre-objective, pre-thematic, and pre-abstract levels. Just as our habitual 
representations in terms of objective presence conceal the more 
concrete phenomenal level of handiness in our everyday worldly 
involvements, so also here both handiness as well as objective presence 
get in the way of the phenomenality of things as they are manifest in 
their own terms without reference to those impositions. In this ontology 
of the fourfold lies Heidegger’s final attempt to rescue things from the 
mathematical projection and, perhaps more urgently, from the totalizing 
framework of standing reserve.  
Heidegger has been accused of being provincial and even reactionary in 
his choice of the old country bridge that “brings wagons and horse 
teams to the surrounding villages.” But as a site for the fourfold, each 
thing gathers in its own way, and so Heidegger immediately adds: “The 
highway bridge is tied into the network of long distance traffic, paced 
and calculated for maximum yield,” thereby not only disclosing the 
haste and efficiency of the essence of technology as the totalizing 
framework that discloses things as mere standing reserve, but also 
exceeding that imposition in the way it brings into presence “the 
lingering and hastening ways of men to and fro, so that they may get to 
other banks and in the end, as mortals, to the other side.”44 Here again 
we have bank and landscape, now as standing-reserve scenery blurring 
by as we hasten to the next destination. But in disclosing this haste it 
implicitly also reveals the way in which modern humanity dwells in the 
context of that ultimate spatial horizon—viz., on the earth and under the 
sky—filling up the time between birth and death hurtling toward the 
final destination as the ultimate temporal horizon. If we should pause 
long enough encounter this bridge, it may bring us to at least 
momentarily reflect on this revealing, what this all means and what the 
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point of it might be, and perhaps even the divine may become manifest 
in its absence.  
Now we may immediately and reactively take it as the height of 
imaginative fancy when we first come across assertions in Heidegger’s 
writing like the following: “Even where the bridge covers the stream, it 
holds its flow up to the sky by taking it for a moment under the vaulted 
gateway and then setting it free once more.”45 However, it is not that 
the bridge merely makes explicit a relationship between the stream, its 
banks, and the sky that is already there and objectively present—as if 
the bridge merely makes us, as conscious subjects, aware of something 
which in itself is ‘there’ regardless of the bridge. If this relationship is 
not merely objectively present, then we must think of the bridge as 
holding and maintaining this relationship in its own way—not as a 
causal production, to be sure, but as providing a site for it such that it 
can occur in this particular way (and it never occurs apart from a 
particular way of occurring, that is, a particular way of appearing, the 
“how” of its phenomenality). The specific “how” of this relationship 
between the stream, its banks, and the sky is mediated and articulated 
by things as sites of the fourfold gathering which lets them belong to 
one another in their mutual distance.  
 
Spatiality and Place 
Heidegger writes: 
The bridge is surely a thing of its own kind; for it gathers the fourfold in 
such a way that it grants [verstattet] a place [Stätte] for it. However, only 
that which is intrinsically a site [Ort] can make room [einräumen] for a 
place. The site is not something already objectively present before the 
bridge is there. Certainly before the bridge is situated, there are many 
positions along the stream which something can come to occupy. One of 
these yields a site and indeed does so through the bridge. Thus the bridge 
does not first come to a site and then stand in it, but rather a site first 
comes to be through the bridge. The bridge is a thing, gathering the 
fourfold, yet gathering in such a way that it grants a place for the fourfold. 
From out of this place are determined the locations and routes through 
which a space [Raum] gets opened up [eingeräumt].46
As a site, a thing can make room for a place which, in turn, admits the 
fourfold in a way that is specific to that site and place. With respect to 
such a place, various locations, courses, paths, roads, and routes can 
then be determined. Through all these locations and routes, space is 
opened up. In this way things first make space possible—as opposed to 
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which things are put or which could just as easily remain empty. Thus 
human spatiality is ontologically made possible by and through things. 
To put it another way, space is made possible by place, and place is 
established through things. Even with this “space,” long before it 
becomes the abstract extension bequeathed to the modern world by 
Descartes, Galileo, et al., it is a space that is cleared for camp and 
settlement. Space is something cleared and opened up within a limit or 
boundary which itself is not merely an external limit where extension 
ceases but is that from which and in terms of which space is first 
cleared. This leads us to the crucial concept of limit and thereby also to 
a remarkable genealogy of abstract space which deserves careful 
attention.  
As a site, the bridge opens up a space into which earth, sky, divinities 
and mortals are admitted and gathered. With respect to the place 
established through the bridge and its placement, other places are also 
opened up in relation to it. These places themselves are variously near 
or far in relation to the site of the bridge. Nearness and remoteness here 
are not yet or are not immediately determined in terms of quantifiable 
distances, but are qualitative and are measured in terms of everyday 
human existence and its worldly involvements. Thus phrases such as “a 
stone’s throw,” “a hop skip and a jump,” “a long haul,” etc. are more 
phenomenologically descriptive of space as it is actually experienced 
prior to its representation in terms of quantifiable distance, even if they 
are impossibly vague and useless from the perspective of the latter.  
In Being and Time, Heidegger characterized human spatiality by what 
he then called “making-near.”47
As soon as we represent things as objects that are present in a 
homogeneously extended abstract space, whose various positions 
within that space can be quantitatively determined, we have abstracted 
from the world horizon. As Heidegger writes, “What is at hand in the 
 Phenomenologically speaking, when 
one is engaged in a conversation with someone, that person is nearer 
than the glasses on one’s face or the shirt on one’s back. When one 
encounters a friend on the street, that person is phenomenologically 
closer than the pavement under one’s feet even though the person may 
be several yards away. In terms of objective presence this makes no 
sense—obviously the person in each of these examples is a greater 
measurable distance from one’s body than the clothes one is wearing or 
the pavement that is touching the soles of one’s feet. But in terms of the 
way we exist in the world among things which appear in terms of that 
world horizon, what may be ‘objectively’ more distant can be brought 
near and so ‘closer,’ phenomenologically speaking, than something 
which is objectively less distant.  
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surrounding world is, after all, not objectively present for an eternal 
spectator exempt from human existence.”48 Making-near is an active 
way in which human beings “spatialize” themselves—they orient 
themselves in and through space in such a way that things are brought 
near out of a vague and generalized background of indeterminacy, and 
space is first articulated in terms of places, only subsequently coming to 
be represented as a single homogeneous and abstract “space.” 
Heidegger says that “remoteness is never understood as measurable 
distance.”49 Indeed, it is this making near that first discovers something 
like “remoteness.”  
Two points are as little remote from each other as two things in general 
because neither of these beings can make-near in accordance with its kind 
of being. They merely have a measurable distance between them which is 
encountered in making-near.50  
In a way that harks back to his own earlier account of spatiality in 
Being and Time, Heidegger says of the bridge:  
Even when we relate ourselves to those things that are not in our 
immediate reach, we are staying with the things themselves. We do not 
represent distant things merely in our minds—as the textbooks have it—so 
that only mental representations of distant things run through our minds 
and heads as substitutes for the things. If all of us now think, from where 
we are right here, of the old bridge in Heidelberg, this thinking toward that 
location is not a mere experience inside the persons present here; rather, it 
belongs to the essence of our thinking of that bridge that in itself thinking 
gets through, persists through, the distance to that location. From this spot 
right here, we are there at the bridge—we are by no means at some 
representational content in our consciousness. From right here we may 
even be much nearer to that bridge and to what it makes room for than 
someone who uses it daily as an indifferent river crossing.51
However, because there are other places variously near or remote from 
the site opened by the bridge, we can then abstract from these things—
that is, we can abstract from the things as gatherings that open up site 
 
What is now added to the earlier account is the suggestion that place 
and space are not primarily the result of human activity as causal 
agents, but rather that such places and spaces are established by things. 
Certainly humans build things such as bridges, but this building is itself 
a response to dwelling on the earth under the sky before the divinities 
and alongside other human existences. Such sites and places don’t 
happen simply because human beings choose to do it, but nor do they 
come about without human participation. Human participation allows 
such sites to be established by building and making things in their 
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and place—and represent them as bare positions. At this point we have, 
in a mental representation, subtracted the things and have something 
more like points whose distance from other points or positions can be 
marked off. This initial measurable distance is what Heidegger traces 
back to the Greek word stadion, which is the kind of space opened up 
by bare positions in abstraction from the concreteness of the things that 
first made place possible and hence also made this abstraction possible. 
The stadion understood as a spatial interval52 between bare positions 
abstracted from things then passes into Latin as spatium. In this way, 
Heidegger argues that “nearness and remoteness between human beings 
and things can become mere distances and intervals of space” between 
various positions, themselves mutually external and indifferent to such 
distances.53 In light of this representation, “the bridge now appears as a 
mere something at some position, which can be occupied at any time by 
something else or replaced by a mere marker.”54
Because place and site have been completely covered over and 
concealed in this series of abstractions, “one can call this 
mathematically opened space ‘the’ space,” the one ‘actual’ space. 
Because no other space is visible any longer, it presents itself as the 
only ‘real’ space, and then it appears as if anything more than that could 
only be something added on to this abstraction by way of subjective 
  
But further abstraction can still be made by representing the intervals of 
stadion/spatium in terms of the three dimensions of height, width, and 
depth, yielding a conception of pure space without even the necessity 
that it be marked off as distances between positions. As long as space is 
an interval between positions, it is still at least tied to a vestige of place 
as position and to a bare echo of things conceived as points or markers 
within that space. But this further abstraction removes the “between” 
character of space and represents it as a “pure manifold of the three 
dimensions.”  
It is here that we finally arrive at modernity’s conception of abstract 
space as pure homogeneous extension—the extensio of Descartes and 
the space from which Kant takes his point of departure in the Critique 
of Pure Reason and which, as a pure form of sensibility, allows for the 
arrangement and ordering of the manifold of sensory data by the 
categories. Here we recognize the mathematical projection of ‘nature’ 
as a sphere of space-time relations, quantifiable in terms of position (to 
which bodies are indifferent) and externally imparted motion 
(measurable distance between positions). And once nature is understood 
this way, as we saw earlier, quantifiability becomes a demand and 
nature is now constrained to show itself according to quantifiable 
relations.  
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projection. And so Kant simply took over this representation without 
further question as if it is the ‘pure form’ of sensory ordering and 
arrangement that the human understanding must always assume. But 
the problem is that  
‘the’ space in this sense contains no spaces and places. In such space we 
never find sites, that is, things of the kind the bridge is. Conversely, 
however, in the space that is opened up by sites there always lies space as 
interval and in the latter in turn there lies space as pure extension.55 
The strong argument here is that beginning with concrete site and place 
established in and through things, one can trace the development of 
space as mere homogeneous extension through a series of abstractions 
that are made from and away from things. On the other hand, if we 
begin with the conception of space as mere homogeneous extension, we 
will never arrive at concrete site and place established in and through 
things by way of adding properties. To put it more succinctly, we can 
get from place to space, but we cannot get from space to place. Hence, 
once again, we see the continuing Heideggerian theme that the 
ontological horizon of objective presence overlooks the world. With its 
capacity of abstraction, human reflection can simply reflect itself right 
out of the world. Here more specifically we can see that it completely 
passes over concrete human dwelling, and it is at best questionable 
whether or not beginning with the ontological assumption of objective 
presence we can ever get to such dwelling—or even raise it as an issue 
worthy of thought—by piecing together objectively present properties 
added on to a subject conceived as an objectively present physiological 
and/or psychological entity, whether through behaviourism or 
neuroscience.  
So Heidegger in his late work comes back full circle to the being-in-
the-world alongside things and with other human existences, now 
ontologically specified through phenomenological clarity in such a way 
that things are given their due and retain their integrity rather than 
merely being externally determined by human interests. Human 
existence requires this integrity and substantiality of things in order to 
provide concrete situations in which to dwell and an enduring 
foundation for our activity. One might fairly say that the thing was 
never really thought at all in the Western philosophical tradition. Prior 
to Heidegger’s contribution, the latter lacked an interpretation of the 
thing that was actually interested in the thing per se—the thing was 
always made to fit some predetermined ontology. The thing itself as 
such never got top priority. The irony here is that the last thing 
philosophy gets to is what we intimately spend our entire lives with—
things. As Heidegger put it, “The nature of the thing never comes to 
light, that is, it never gets a hearing.”56  
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The way “Being” shows itself is a spatial and temporal showing. It is 
things that spatialize and temporalize Being. The world is always a 
measure that defines a particular limit on the basis of which beings are 
then manifest. That limit or measure is determined by the things 
themselves. They co-define their own mode of unconcealment with 
respect to each other. Mortals do not just become what they are through 
an individuated being-toward-death as Being and Time had it, but also 
within the larger context of the fourfold. And so we return to the theme 
mentioned above:  
Thinking in this way, we are called by the thing as the thing. We are—in 
the strict sense of the German word—the ones “be-thinged” or 
conditioned [die Be-dingten]. We have left the presumption of all 
unconditionedness behind us.57 
 
The collapse of the nature/artifice dualism in the thing 
The ontological determination operative here is “thing”—not the 
abstraction of ‘thinghood’ or even the earlier “thingly character” from 
The Origin of the Work of Art, but things in their concrete 
phenomenality as gatherings that spatialize and temporalize the world 
in terms of which human existence is articulated. Since “the thing” is 
the primary ontological determination, other determinacies, such as 
“nature” and “artifice,” are subordinate ones rather than guiding 
categories in terms of which things are classified. This suspension of 
the nature/artifice distinction is implied by Heidegger’s suggestion that 
among possible things we might find not only artifacts like “the jug and 
the bench, the footbridge and the plough”:  
But things in their own way also are tree and pond, brook and mountain. 
Things, each for a while thinging in its own way, are heron and deer, 
horse and bull. Things, each for a while thinging after its own manner, are 
mirror and brooch, book and picture, crown and cross. 58
Viewed in terms of the ancient distinction between phusis and techne, 
this list of things would seem to have little in common insofar as it 
blurs together artifacts such as jugs and brooches with natural entities 
such as mountains and herons. But Heidegger’s account here suggests 
that the nature/artifice distinction is collapsed in the thing. Or, to put the 
point more cautiously, in Heidegger’s ontology of things, the 
nature/artifact distinction is no longer the guiding determination. Thus 
rather than embrace ‘the end of nature’ in favour of artifice as Vogel 
seems to do, 
 
59 Heidegger’s ontology suggests that we suspend the 
entire nature/artifice distinction in a phenomenology of things that 
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attends to how each thing “things”—that is, gathers, spatializes, and 
temporalizes the beings around it—in its own way and after its own 
manner. This “in its own way” (nach ihrer Weise) indicates the 
necessity of carefully attending to the manner in which a thing gathers, 
spatializes, and temporalizes without assuming the nature/artifice 
distinction in advance as an interpretive principle. As “the conditioned 
ones,” we attend to the “own way” in which a thing is manifest.  
 
Heideggerian ecological practice  
The much-celebrated Heideggerian notion of Gelassenheit, variously 
translated as “letting be” or “releasement,” means to step back out of 
representational thinking into a kind of thinking that is not in a hurry to 
impose its ordering and calculations on things—it is not on a mission to 
follow the modernist project of putting questions to nature and forcing 
her to answer but rather, contra Kant, allows itself to “follow her 
leading strings.” But the key point here is that Gelassenheit is not a 
subjective stance toward things, nor is its point of locus and orientation 
in human existence, but rather in the things themselves. Any mere “shift 
of attitude” would still accord primacy to the subject, and so it would 
not be things per se that count but rather the subject’s stance toward 
them. This is the problem with all talk about becoming more conscious 
or of changing consciousness such as Vogel’s suggested ethical 
criterion of self-awareness mentioned above. Such recommendations 
still begin and return to the subject as the seat of consciousness, and the 
things once again pass into obscurity or are tacitly represented as 
objects within the mathematical project—objects to which, in addition 
to their physical properties, we may also impute other values more in 
keeping with environmental concerns.  
For this reason, also, what Heidegger here calls “the thing” is not a 
generalized paradigm or universal model whose formal features can be 
routinely applied to anything and everything. This too would again 
relegate it to the status of a subjective representation that is then 
‘applied’—and we would be back within a quasi-Kantian schema in 
which formal categories of the understanding are mediated by the 
imagination in their application to sensory givens. The understanding 
would again be the active agent giving to itself in representation what is 
to count as a thing. The suspension of such generally applicable 
conceptual models—that is, the suspension of representational 
thinking—is indicated when Heidegger writes that each thing “things” 
in its own way.  
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In his letter to a student that forms the epilogue to the essay “The 
Thing,” Heidegger noted that the thinking that attends to things is 
inseparable from that which attends to representational thinking, 
remarking that people tend to “listen happily and attentively” to his 
semipoetic account of jugs and bridges, but 
immediately close their ears when the talk turns to objectness, the 
standing forth and arrival of production—when it turns to the totalizing 
framework [Gestell]. But all this belongs necessarily to the thinking of the 
thing, a thinking that thinks of the possible advent of world and, so 
remembering this, perhaps in the smallest and unpretentious matters helps 
such advent reach the point of the opened region that belongs to 
humanity’s essence.60 
We might venture to put it this way: attending to things in the step back 
out of the mathematical project is inseparable from explicitly examining 
the character of that project, which entails stepping back into it again. 
We never simply leap out of the prevailing mode of unconcealment that 
defines our own historical epoch. Heidegger is emphatic on this point: 
“The step back out of the representational thinking of metaphysics does 
not reject or disavow this thinking.”61
For instance, within the representation of all things as quantifiable 
objects occupying positions in homogeneous space, and more so within 
the framework that makes them appear as mere standing reserve, it 
makes little sense to speak of the beauty or integrity of things. Locked 
within such horizons, all talk of beauty or integrity looks like mere 
 Rather, it steps back out of it into 
a thinking that remains attentive to the phenomenality of things. The 
step back is not a rejection or disavowal, and hence it does not spurn 
representational thinking by banishing it to the status of Heideggerian 
anathema. This means that the way is open to return to that very 
representational thinking from out of the step back.  
It is this return, it seems to me, that allows for effective political action 
and practice to be carried out within modernity’s horizon of the 
mathematical projection. Thus a Heideggerian approach does not 
eschew conservation, strategies of sustainability, and the thoughtful 
allocation of the things we need from nature etc., which all would seem 
to transpire within the mathematical projection rather than outside of it 
insofar as it cannot avoid the calculation of ‘resources’ at some level. 
The phenomenology of things does not directly address the latter 
concerns, but neither must it minimize their importance, and in addition 
it may foster a kind of ontological sensitivity such that when we do 
return to the modern horizon from the step back that lets things be 
things, we return with an added sense of what must be preserved and 
saved and we can thereby operate within the mathematical projection 
by making use of it for purposes that may well lie outside of it.  
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subjective attitudes and affectations having nothing to do with the 
things themselves, which for their part remain external and indifferent 
to any such human concerns.62 However, having allowed the 
phenomenality of things to come to presence in our thought as sites of 
world-gathering—as spatializing/temporalizing events rather than as 
atomistic substances abstracted from relation or mere relata in a 
network of forces or information—we are then free to make use of the 
mathematical projection without being confined by it. This is what 
saves the Heideggerian account from lapsing onto a form of pacifism or 
quietism. And this also shows that Heideggerian ecological practice has 
nothing to do with adding poetic descriptions or fanciful subjective 
sentimentality to things which otherwise are mere objects, as if the 
latter is the default value and starting point, but rather is a kind of 
subtraction that steps back from representational thinking. It’s not a 
matter of adding something to things but of subtracting from them our 
own habitual representations in order to first let them appear as things, 
viz., as the sites of gathering or assembly that they then show 
themselves to be.  
Even if they are not mere ‘products’ in the sense of having their 
phenomenality exhausted by the production process, the things to which 
Heidegger devotes the most sustained attention are made by human 
beings (the jug, the bridge and, earlier, artworks). When Heidegger 
does mention things that are not made—“tree and pond, brook and 
mountain . . .  heron and deer, horse and bull”63
One might object that if the distinction between phusis and techne is no 
longer determinative, are we not reinvoking that very distinction by 
calling attention to the fact that the things Heidegger takes as exemplary 
are created by human beings as opposed to the ‘natural’ entities like 
trees, mountains, and deer? However, the point is not that we cannot 
conceive of such a distinction anymore, but rather that this distinction is 
no longer ontologically determinative—any more than, say, other 
empirical distinctions we might draw between the respective properties 
of a jug and footbridge considered as objects. Indeed, in a discussion of 
the way in which things “stand forth” as independent or self-subsistent, 
Heidegger writes that such “standing forth has the sense of coming 
from somewhere, whether this be a process of bringing itself forth or of 
being produced.”
—he passes them by 
without comment. With the possible exception of “horse and bull,” 
these things are not produced by human beings in any sense, but 
Heidegger does not give us much in the way of guidance regarding how 
to think their phenomenality as things. Hence the task of thinking such 
phenomenality remains open.  
64 Here the distinction between phusis as “bringing 
itself forth” and techne as “being produced” is implicitly invoked. Thus 
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the distinction is operative but not determinative—that is, the 
distinction does not mark out two kinds of entities that are ontologically 
distinct insofar as both are things. Each thing “things” in its own way—
that is, each thing has its own specific manner of gathering—and so 
careful attention must be given to the phenomenality of each thing in its 
own right and in its own terms without assuming in advance that 
because it can be situated within a category like artifice or nature, 
techne or phusis,—or even “thing” for that matter—it must exhibit 
certain predetermined ontological characteristics.  
Thus, when Heidegger says that each thing “things in its own way,” he 
seems to be indicating a radical heterogeneity. For this reason we 
should avoid thinking that, on the one hand there are things like bridges 
and jugs that “thing” in a certain way, and on the other hand there are 
things like deer and trees that “thing” in a different way. This would be 
to re-establish the distinction between phusis and techne as marking a 
fundamental ontological dividing line between the natural and the 
artificial. Indeed, any interpretive framework that seeks to place all 
“things like x” in a certain category has already failed to step back out 
of representational thinking. This compounds the difficulty for it 
increases the care with which thought must approach things. However 
the deer “things”—in whatever way it may show itself as a site of 
gathering or assembly—it must be allowed to show itself in its own 
terms rather than in terms of a predetermined paradigm or model. This 
means that we cannot take the bridge or the jug as providing such a 
model. As previously mentioned, the “thing” is not an abstract formal 
universal that can be routinely applied to phenomena.  
In this vein as well, one may wonder how the rustic bridge or the jug 
differs from mass produced commodities like disposable lighters or 
Styrofoam cups. Given the suspension of the nature/artifice distinction, 
one may wonder how “tree and pond, brook and mountain” differ from 
“parking lot and corporate tower, industrial factory and oil pipeline.” 
Have we landed back in the very relativism that Vogel rightly worries 
about? But the heterogeneity Heidegger indicates in this ontology of 
things precludes such a formal universality that would subsume all 
these various phenomena under a single category. This means that in 
attending to the way each thing “things in its own way,” we may well 
discover that “way” to be radically different when the phenomenon in 
question is a corporate tower as opposed to a rustic bridge. Indeed, it 
also means that we cannot simply assume in advance that every 
phenomenon will necessarily even show itself to be a “thing” in the 
sense of a gathering.  
How then might the deer Heidegger mentions in passing be a gathering 
in this sense of a “thing”? We might approach the question along the 
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lines of Heidegger’s semi-poetic way of letting philosophical thought 
and poetry reside together, attempting to let what appears in and as a 
deer show itself in its own terms without taking it up into the 
representational thinking as an object for consciousness to examine.65
On the other hand, if human existence belongs to the entire context of a 
world that is gathered as a fourfold (or perhaps a “whatever-fold”), then 
the gathering that deer, forest, heron, and marsh gather may well 
include the human existence that now must watch over it and preserve 
it, only thereby letting them “thing” rather than get used up in the 
globalized exploitation by which perhaps no things any longer can 
remain untouched. And this context may indeed also invoke something 
like a divine element as the temporal limit of this world horizon, a 
 
The deer is not an isolated organism-entity except by abstraction. One 
can certainly represent the animal this way in thought, but only by 
extracting her from the forest in which she has her life and being. The 
trees provide shelter and the bushes sustenance for her foraging. The 
deer invokes in her presence the forest of which she is a part, and 
thereby also the earth from which the forest emerges and rises upwards 
toward the sky. The flora among which she has her shelter and into 
which she flees from danger reach up to the sky for light, bringing the 
sky’s light down into themselves and into the deer, who nourishes 
herself from them. Thereby, the deer’s presence carries with it the sky. 
As a gathering, she gathers earth and sky into a single presence. The 
forest too is a thing in the sense of a gathering: it assembles earth and 
sky as well as the plethora of living beings inhabiting it into its quiet 
presence, a presence teeming with life on the earth, under the sky.  
Knee-deep in the shallows of a pond, the heron waits motionlessly for 
signs of movement from the water beneath its patient gaze. It gathers 
into one presence the earth as marsh, the waterways that meander 
toward the sea, the interface between land and water in which the heron 
negotiates its living process. Repeating the pattern of the reed in its 
motionlessness, it takes into itself the pattern it repeats and thereby 
deceives the hapless frog who will be its next meal.  
One cannot help but notice that introducing the “divinities” or perhaps 
even the “mortals” into the way these things “thing” or gather would 
seem to be a matter of externally importing something for the sake of 
applying a predetermined model of the “fourfold.” Perhaps these things 
do not gather gods and mortals but only earth and sky, along with the 
further specificity of earth as forest or marsh. Perhaps the sky is only 
gathered in the most general way as light and darkness, or perhaps more 
specifically depending on the manner in which each thing gathers—for 
instance, as the guiding orientation for migratory birds.  
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historical temporality that opens up in the step back out of the 
distanceless oblivion of the totalizing framework.66  
However, if we return to Heidegger’s only sustained attempt to provide 
an ontological account of animal life, there may be yet another way of 
situating living beings within the world-gathering of the fourfold—
albeit perhaps completely outside of Heidegger’s own intentions.  
 
Animals, the open, and death 
In his discussion of the part played by the mortals in the fourfold, 
Heidegger repeats intact the well-known distinction that had been 
asserted in Being and Time between human existence as capable of 
dying (sterben) and animal life as merely capable of perishing 
(verenden): “To die means to be capable of death as death. Only human 
beings die. The animal perishes. It has death as death neither before 
itself nor behind itself.”67 
Although much has been made of the way Heidegger’s division 
between humans and animals functions rhetorically in its 
reestablishment of a classic metaphysical opposition and its importance 
to the latter,68 that is not my concern here. I only wish to note that this 
reference to the animal is 1) hastily mentioned in passing, not in order 
to say anything at all about animals per se, but rather to provide a 
rhetorical contrast with the mortality of humans, and 2) markedly 
inconsistent with claims Heidegger himself had earlier made regarding 
animals. It is to these earlier claims that I now wish to turn, after which 
I will bring them to bear with respect to the ontology of the fourfold.  
From early on, Heidegger was quite ambivalent as to the question of 
whether or not the animal has a world and what the implications might 
be if it does. In Being and Time he asserts the same distinction between 
dying and perishing (sterben as opposed to verenden) that reappears in 
the “The Thing.”69 But also in Being and Time he writes the following 
remarkable sentences: “In the broadest sense death is a phenomenon of 
life. Life must be understood as a kind of being to which belongs a 
being-in-the-world.”70  
In a 1929/30 lecture course he characterized the animal as world-poor 
(weltarm), as having a world in not having one.71 Then a few years 
later, in 1935, he not only denied the animal a world, but denies it an 
environment (Umwelt) as well: “World is always a world of the spirit. 
The animal has no world nor any environment.”72  
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But it was in the earlier 1929/30 lecture course that Heidegger had 
made his most sustained attempt to articulate the ontological structure 
of animal life, an account that must confront the death of the animal. 
For Heidegger, death “belongs to the innermost essence of life.”73 
Given the structure of being toward death that characterizes human 
existence, Heidegger is very attentive to the phenomenon of death when 
it comes to non-human life as well. 
The 1929/30 lecture course argues that the animal is caught up in a kind 
of enthrallment or captivation (Benommenheit) with its environment, 
and as such is “essentially exposed to something other than itself, 
something that can indeed never be manifest to the animal either as a 
being or as a non-being.”74 What the animal is open to in general is 
what Heidegger calls a “disinhibitor,”75 which roughly corresponds to 
what biologists sometimes call a “trigger.” The disinhibitor is that to 
which the animal is in some way open through its self-enclosure, and 
which releases or “disinhibits” that self-enclosure as a stimulus, thereby 
also releasing the possibility of instinctual movement or drive. The 
animal is not open to beings or non-beings, but in its enthrallment the 
animal is an openness to the disinhibition. In closing his attempt to 
think the essence of animal life—an attempt to which he will never 
return—Heidegger remarks, “Rather that which disinhibits, with all the 
various forms of disinhibition it entails, brings an essential disruption 
into the essence of the animal.”76 This “essential disruption” is 
Heidegger’s attempt to articulate the death of the animal as distinct 
from the death of human beings. But the way in which death belongs to 
non-human life remains ambiguous and problematic, so much so that 
Heidegger must conclude:  
Earlier on we emphasized that having the possibility of the manifestness 
of beings withheld constitutes merely one structural moment of 
captivation and cannot therefore be the essential ground of the whole as 
such. But we can now reply that in the last analysis we have not yet 
clarified the essential organization of the organism sufficiently at all, so as 
to be able to decide the significance of this withholding, and that we 
cannot clarify it until and unless we also take into account the 
fundamental phenomenon of the life process and thus death as well.77
There are several curious junctures in Heidegger’s lecture course that 
indicate a region of “closest proximity” of animal life to what he takes 
to be the most authentically human structural characteristic of 
existence. The point at which human existence becomes most 
authentically human is not first and foremost characterized by an 
openness to beings and to the possibilities that come to light therein. 
Indeed, this point is not characterized by “openness” at all. To be sure, 
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only itself made possible when human existence is completely closed 
off from all possibilities in moods like “profound boredom,” in which 
one cannot seem to do anything with anything. It is only in such moods, 
in the withholding and suspension of those worldly involvements in 
terms of which human beings go about their daily affairs projecting 
various possibilities, only when all possibilities and all openness is 
withheld, that human existence can first come before itself as pure 
possibility per se—not possibility of this or that, but existence itself as 
openness to possibility. In his own discussion of the 1929/30 lecture 
course, Giorgio Agamben points out that the openness to possibility 
characteristic of human existence is only itself opened up by beginning 
“from a deactivation of single, factical possibilities.”78 Thus the 
celebrated Heideggerian “clearing” of openness to beings is itself 
grounded in closedness, and the very givenness of beings is first opened 
up by the withholding of beings in moods like boredom and anxiety.  
Nearly the entire first part of the 1929/30 lecture course is devoted to a 
sustained discussion of the mood of boredom. As is well known, earlier 
in Being and Time Heidegger has thematized the mood of anxiety as 
bringing about this closedness or withholding of beings and their 
possibilities, thereby exposing human existence to its own ontological 
structure as possibility. From the same period, in Heidegger’s 1929 
inaugural lecture entitled “What is Metaphysics?”, he again thematizes 
anxiety, but also mentions other possible moods in which beings as a 
totality are manifest: profound joy and, again, profound boredom.79 
Agamben suggests that the point of proximity “in which human 
openness in a world and animal openness toward its disinhibitor seem 
for a moment to meet—is boredom.”80 It is not that the animal 
experiences boredom per se, but that the animal in its own way 
experiences the closedness that human existence for its part experiences 
in boredom. The point is that both animal and human are, “in their most 
proper gesture, open to a closedness; they are totally delivered over to 
something that obstinately refuses itself.”81
Agamben does not however point out another curious proximity to 
which David Krell has called attention: the word Benommenheit (along 
with its verbal form benommen) is not only the word Heidegger uses in 
the 1929/30 lecture course for the way in which the animal is 
“captivated” in its disinhibitors, but in Being and Time the same word 
also characterizes human existence in two important and diametrically 
opposed respects. On the one hand, the word characterizes the way in 
which human existence is caught up in an inauthentic selfhood (via das 
Man or “the they”) and confuses its own being with that of objects and 
implements. But on the other hand, it also characterizes the way in 
which human existence, in anxiety, is brought before its own authentic 
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being.82 As Krell characterizes this tension between a benommen 
inauthenticity and an equally benommen authenticity: “Dasein as 
forlorn creature, very like a dazed animal, and Dasein as crystalline, 
transparent self. In both cases benumbed.”83 
Human and animal: both benumbed, and both open, but open to a 
closedness. Agamben spells out what he takes to be the implications of 
Heidegger’s account of this curious proximity between human and 
animal, a proximity that appears to be unavoidable even in the heart of 
an account that tries very hard to differentiate them: 
Dasein [human existence] is simply an animal that has learned to become 
bored; it has awakened from its own captivation to its own captivation. 
This awakening of the living being to its own being-captivated, this 
anxious and resolute opening to a not-open, is the human.84
“The nothing” then names this refusal of beings which, thrust forth in 
their utter opacity and superfluity, are withheld from the horizon of the 
everyday understanding that seeks to grasp them in terms of habitual 
worldly involvements. In other words, “the nothing” names the very 
closedness to which the animal is likewise open. Therefore—insofar as 
we are under no necessity to follow Heidegger and forget his own 
earlier painstaking attention to animals in the 1929/30 lecture course—
we might venture to suggest that if the animal is structurally determined 
as an openness to a closedness, and if that closedness is manifest as “the 
nothing” in human moods, then the animal too experiences the “shrine 
 
In this way anthropocentric privilege is superseded by difference, a 
difference in the way that animal concealedness is encountered.  
Immediately following the above-cited denial of animal death in “The 
Thing,” Heidegger explicitly refers to death as “the shrine of the 
nothing.” What is meant by this invocation of “the nothing”? Heidegger 
is explicitly harking back to the period of the 1929/30 lecture course in 
which he presented the inaugural lecture “What is Metaphysics?,” 
which was occupied with a sustained discussion of “the nothing.” 
According to that analysis, behind the more superficial meaning of 
logical negation, the nothing turns out to be an experience of the 
“nihilation” of the totality of beings. This nihilation does not consist in 
the literal annihilation of everything, but rather refers to the specific 
way in which the totality of beings comes to presence in certain moods. 
Specifically attending to the mood of anxiety, Heidegger there argues 
that in this mood the totality of beings is present, but they are present as 
superfluous, as receding or “slipping away.” It is this whole-of-things-
as-superfluous that Heidegger claims is the more primary manifestation 
of “the nothing” long before we appropriate this experience in the “not” 
of logical negation.  
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of the nothing,” though perhaps without the religious/mythical 
overtones invoked by the notion of a “shrine.”85  
 
Back to the fourfold 
Now since Heidegger mentions “deer” and “herons” as things that 
gather in the sense he has indicated with respect to the jug and the 
bridge, and since these are ‘animals,’ how do things look if we regard 
these animals as things? As we have seen, Heidegger makes rhetorical 
use of the concept of the animal in “The Thing” merely to set off 
human “dying” against animal “perishing.” But this renders its 
importance suspect insofar as his account purports to be an attempt to 
let things be things and which regards we humans as the conditioned 
ones. These considerations, taken together with careful attention to the 
1929/30 lecture course, might seem to suggest that an age-old 
metaphysical division has been imposed on ‘the animal’ with little 
attention given to the way in which this being might be manifest in its 
own terms.  
What happens if we make the thought-experiment and read Heidegger’s 
own earlier account of the animal into the late ontology of things as 
gatherings of the fourfold? First of all, against Heidegger’s later 
denials, we would insist that animals do indeed die, and that as such a 
kind of being-in-the-world belongs to them. Secondly, we may even go 
so far as to nuance this manner of being-in-the-world as a “having of 
world in not having it”—viz., as what Heidegger had called “world-
poor.” In what does such world poverty consist? It consists in the 
assumption that the world does not appear “as such” to the animal. 
Rather, the totality of beings is withheld from the animal—it is only 
open to this closedness or concealment of world, and can only respond 
to what disinhibits it from out of that closedness. In its encounter with 
closedness, the latter is not present explicitly—the animal doesn’t 
experience the closedness as closedness. But its entire experience is 
nonetheless “essentially disrupted” when it dies. Human existence, on 
the other hand, is open to this closedness first and foremost through 
moods such as profound boredom or anxiety. Having already rejected 
the metaphysical representation of human specificity as an animal with 
the added property of reason or logos, nonetheless there remains a 
distinction between the human and the animal in the way in which each 
is open to a closedness. As Agamben puts it, a human being “is simply 
an animal that has learned to become bored” and thereby awakens “to 
its own being-captivated.”86  
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If animals do indeed die, then they belong within the sphere of 
mortality as mortal life, and this is what is gathered by things along 
with the other world neighbours: earth and sky, divinities and mortal 
life. Even a desolate landscape, gathering earth and sky, may also 
invoke mortal life in its absence much as the empty sky according to 
Heidegger invokes the divine in its absence. Mortal life forms a covert 
throng gathered in the fourfold as the life that emerges in the space 
opened up by earth and sky.  
In this light, not only does Heidegger’s dismissive account of animals 
in “The Thing” seem hasty, but so also does his relegation of any 
assumed connection between mortals and life to the metaphysical 
notion that represents what is proper to humans by adding the predicate 
of reason to the conception of a living being.87 His own earlier account 
of animals yields a markedly different conclusion: that humanity and 
animals share the point of closest proximity in that both are equally 
open to a closedness, and it is precisely this closedness that first brings 
human existence before itself as possibility and thereby opens up the 
authentically human sphere.  
However, insofar as mortal humans experience closedness explicitly in 
moods, they are in a unique position to preserve that closedness—to 
shelter it as the earth that refuses disclosure, rising up through world in 
both artworks and in things. This sheltering, saving and preserving of 
earth’s closedness—captured in Heidegger’s one word schonen—is 
only made possible through things, and by letting them be things. It is 
only in this sense, with respect to concrete things as sites of world 
gathering, that Agamben is correct to assert that “the supreme category 
of Heidegger’s ontology is stated: letting be.”88 But this “letting be” in 
turn is only possible through the step back out of the mathematical 
projection and out of the subsequent arraigning of things within the 
framework of standing reserve, a framework that conceals its own 
refusal in refusing to let them be anything other than what they have 
already been determined to be in its terms. As Michael Shellenberger 
and Ted Nordhaus have suggested, 
What the environmental movement needs more than anything else right 
now is to take a collective step back to rethink everything. We will never 
be able to turn things around as long as we understand our failures as 
essentially tactical, and make proposals that are essentially technical.89
Because of the necessity of human interaction, even if it is not simply a 
matter of human control and technical manipulation, I prefer an 
expanded version of Agamben’s ‘supreme category’—not just “letting 
be,” which might connote mere passivity, but “letting things be things,” 
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“conditioned” ones, but we are involved in allowing this to come about, 
and so human participation is essential.90  
 
Conclusion  
The above are no doubt at best provisional, beginning attempts to think 
of living beings, and what we would otherwise call “natural 
ecosystems” like forests and marshes, as things in an admittedly cursory 
manner. But these attempts are merely meant to indicate in a very 
general way how one might begin to step back out of representational 
thinking and thoughtfully encounter things other than the “produced” 
things with which Heidegger tended to limit his own analyses. Each 
thing gathers in its own way, and we are the conditioned ones: this 
indicates the kind of practice that Heidegger’s thought pointed toward 
without necessarily carrying through, leaving that to others to do. It is 
this practice that we carry with us when, from the step back out of the 
mathematical project, we step forward into it again in our attempts on 
multiple fronts to establish sustainable relations of human existence to a 
world that can be gathered and assembled by things as sites of such 
gathering. In this way the things belonging to what we might otherwise 
have called ‘nature’ are fostered and preserved along with those that we 
might otherwise have called ‘artifice,’ thereby moving us beyond the 
commodified world in which all things, whether ‘natural’ or ‘artificial,’ 
tend to count as so much usable resource kept on hand in constant 
availability. Thus, contrary to the views of Elliott and Katz, who worry 
about ‘faking nature’ with artifice, it is by suspending the 
“nature/artifice” dualism in the care for preserving things as sites of 
world-assembly that we may learn to dwell among those things in non-
exploitative ways that neither alienate our humanity from the world nor 
banish us from the garden. And a care for things that does not make the 
nature/artifice distinction paramount may be what is needed for a real 
vision of alternative living that can open up a world-context without 
which the merely tactical and technical stop-gap measures of recent 





Agamben, Giorgio. 2004. The Open: Man and Animal. Trans. Kevin 
Attell. Stanford: Stanford University Press.  
The Trumpeter 36 
Bigger, Charles. 2005. Between Chora and the Good: Metaphor’s 
Metaphysical Neighborhood. New York: Fordham University 
Press. 
Callicott, J. Baird. 1989. In Defense of the Land Ethic: Essays in 
Environmental Philosophy, Albany: State University of New 
York Press.  
Derrida, Jacques. 1989. Of Spirit. Trans. Geoffrey Benington and 
Rachel Bowlby. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
Descartes, Rene. 1985. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Vol. 
1. Trans. J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, and D. Murdoch. New 
York: Cambridge U. Press. 
Elliott, Robert, ed. 1995. Environmental Ethics. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Heidegger, Martin. 1954. Vorträge und Aufsätze. Verlag Günther Neske 
Pfullingen. 
———. 1959. An Introduction to Metaphysics. Trans. R. Manheim. 
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.  
———. 1967. What is a Thing? Trans. W. B. Barton and Vera Deutsch. 
Chicago: Henry Regnery Co. 
———. 1983. Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik: Welt-Endlichkeit-
Einsamkeit. Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann.  
———. 1991. Nietzsche, v. III. Trans. David Krell.  San Francisco: 
Harper Collins. 
———. 1993. What is Metaphysics? In Basic Writings, ed. David 
Krell. San Francisco: Harper.  
———. 1995. The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, 
Finitude, Solitude. Trans. William McNeill and Nicholas 
Walker.  Boomington: Indiana University Press. 
———. 1996. Being and Time. Trans. Joan Stambaugh. Albany: State 
University of New York Press. 
———. 2001. Poetry, Language, Thought. Trans. Albert Hofstadter.  
New York: HarperCollins. 
Kant, Immanuel. 1965. Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. Norman Kemp 
Smith. New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
Katz, Erik. 1997. Nature as Subject: Human Obligation and Natural 
Community. New York: Rowman & Littlefield. 
 
 
Volume 24, Number 3 
 
37 
Krell, David. 1992. Daimon Life: Heidegger and Life-Philosophy. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Llewellyn, John. 1991. The Middle Voice of Ecological Conscience: A 
Chiasmic Reading of Responsibility in the Neighbourhood of 
Levinas, Heidegger and Others. Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan.  
Mayr, Ernst. 1982. The Growth of Biological Thought: Diversity, 
Evolution, and Inheritance. Cambridge: Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press. 
Peters, Michael, and Irwin, Ruth. 2002. Earthsongs: Ecopoetics, 
Heidegger and Dwelling. The Trumpeter 18 (1): 1–17. 
Schalow, Frank. 2000. Who Speaks for the Animals? Heidegger and the 
Question of Animal Welfare. Environmental Ethics 22 (3): 259–
272. 
Shellenberger, Michael, and Ted Nordhaus. 2005. The Death of 
Environmentalism: Global warming politics in a post-
environmental world. Grist: Environmental News and 
Commentary (January 13). 
(http://www.grist.org/news/maindish/2005/01/13/doe-reprint/) 
Thiele, Leslie Paul. 1995. Nature and Freedom: A Heideggarian 
Critique of Biocentric and Sociocentric Environmentalism. 
Environmental Ethics 17 (2): 170–190. 
Vogel, Steven. 2002. Environmental Philosophy after the End of 
Nature.  Environmental Ethics 24 (1): 23–39. 
Yeuk-Sze Lo. 1999. Natural and Artifactual: Restored Nature as 
Subject,” in Environmental Ethics, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Fall 1999), 
pp. 247-266. 
Young, Damon. 2002. “Not Easy Being Green: Process, Poetry and the 





                                                 
1 Reproduced in Elliott 1995, pp. 76 ff.  
2 In Katz 1997, pp. 93 ff.  
3 Ibid., p. 93. For a critique of Katz and the nature/artifact dualism on different 
grounds than that undertaken here, see Yeuk-Sze Lo 1999.  
4 Vogel 2002.  
The Trumpeter 38 
                                                                                                                     
5 Ibid., p. 24. 
6 Ibid., p. 33. 
7 Ibid., p. 34. 
8 Ibid., p. 35. 
9 "Communication is never anything like the conveying of experiences, for example, 
opinions and wishes, from the inside of one subject to the inside of another . . . In 
talking, human existence expresses itself not because it has been initially cut off as 
'something internal' from something outside, but because as being-in-the-world it is 
already 'outside' when it understands. What is expressed is precisely this being outside 
. . ." (Heidegger 1996, p. 152). (In all citations of Stambaugh's translation as well as in 
my own translations, I will commit the Heideggerian sin of replacing the customarily 
untranslated German word Dasein with "human existence" in the hope of making his 
thought a bit more accessible in ordinary English.)  
10 Heidegger 1996,  p. 397. 
11 Heidegger 1967.  
12 Ibid. section B5: "The modern mathematical science of nature and the origin of a 
critique of pure reason," pp. 65 ff.  
13 Ibid., p. 88.  
14 Cited in Mayr 1982, p. 39. 
15 "For I freely acknowledge that I recognize no matter in corporeal things apart from 
that which the geometers call quantity." (Descartes 1985, p. 247).  
16  Heidegger 1967, pp. 88–89, fn 22. (The original text cited can be found in Kant's 
Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Norman Kemp Smith, New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1965, p. 20.) 
17 Ibid., p. 93. 
18 Heidegger 1995. This is a translation of the 1929/30 lecture course published in 
German as Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik: Welt-Endlichkeit-Einsamkeit 
(Heidegger 1983). 
19 Agamben 2004, p. 65. 
20 See "What is Metaphysics?" in Basic Writings (Heidegger 1993, 89 ff.).  
21 This phrase roughly translates the German word Vorstellung. 
22 Heidegger 1991, p. 221. 
23 Ibid., p. 219. 
24 Ibid., p. 222. 
25 Ibid., p. 223. 
26 Indeed, one does not have to be a Heideggerian to see that the assertion, 
"Everything is socially constructed," must also apply to this assertion itself, which 
then makes its claim to tell us something about the way things "really are" suspect. If 
that is not "mystification," then I'm not sure what would be . . .  
27  These lectures are "Building Dwelling, Thinking," "The Thing," and "Poetically 
Man Dwells," published in Martin Heidegger, Vorträge und Aufsätze (Heidegger 
1954). They are available in English translation in Martin Heidegger, Poetry, 
Language, Thought, translated by Albert Hofstadter (Heidegger 2001). Where the 
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translations are mine, references to this work are listed Heidegger 1954 / Heidegger 
2001; where I have adopted Hofstadter's translation, the references to this work are 
listed as Heidegger 2001; Heidegger 1954. 
28 For example, see Schalow 2000 and Thiele 1995. 
29 Heidegger 1954, p. 179; Heidegger 2001, p. 181. 
30 My understanding of Heidegger is greatly indebted to the clarity of Gregory 
Schufreider's unpublished lectures on the subject, lectures which first opened up the 
Heideggerian corpus to me. Professor Schufreider's way of reading that corpus has 
remained with me and, in my view, still stand as the most compelling of the 
interpretations out there.  
31 We will have to carefully qualify this generalization, however, since the "thing" as 
Heidegger thinks it is not a formal universal that can be routinely applied to anything 
and everything.  
32 Heidegger 1954, p. 149; Heidegger 2001, p. 149. 
33 The "divinities" are said to be "the hinting messengers of the godhead." (winkenden 
Boten der Gottheit - Heidegger 1954, p. 150; Heidegger 2001, p. 150). The German 
Wink means a sign, wink, hint, suggestion. Bote means "messenger" or "herald," and 
is the word that is applied to Christ's twelve apostles: die Zwolf Boten Christi. By 
Göttlichen Heidegger may mean something like "hints of the divine." In a world of 
quantifiable objects, the god does not appear. Perhaps all we have in the technological 
era of the totalizing framework are hints of holiness, hints that herald the divine in its 
absence. The main thing I would be concerned to avoid here are metaphysical 
conceptions of a transcendental divine sphere beyond the world. Whatever we make 
of "the divinities" here, they are what they are only in relation to the others within the 
fourfold, and this relation only happens in and through things. Thus in Heidegger's 
thinking there is no "divine" in and for itself. There is no "absolute" apart from things. 
Even when such a belief is adopted, God is immediately conceived as the creator—
that is, as the support for things. There may always be a desire to isolate each member 
of the fourfold, but in order to make that attempt one must abstract oneself out of the 
world. Any time human beings have ever encountered the divine in any way, they 
have always been on the earth, under the sky, and mortal. 
34 Heidegger names the unified belonging-together of the "four world neighbours" das 
Geviert, the "fourfold." Vier means "four," so vierfach would then be "fourfold." 
Heidegger seems to be trying to indicate something verbal rather than nominal here: 
the four happens. The mutual relating of the four is an event. In the previously 
mentioned lecture on "The Thing," he calls it the "round dance of the four." If vier 
were a verb, vieren would mean "to four." Much as Heidegger will take the German 
noun Wesen ("essence") and employ it against ordinary German usage as a verb, he 
here takes the adjective vier as a verb and uses the past participial form of it, Geviert, 
then adds a definite article to reinscribe the nominal sense, winding up with das 
Geviert, quite literally "the having foured." Perhaps "the fouring" would be a better 
translation. But to make it more legible in English I will keep to Hofstadter's now 
traditional translation as "the fourfold," with the proviso that we keep in mind the 
verbal, eventive sense Heidegger wants to convey with this term. 
35 Heidegger 1954, p. 150; Heidegger 2001, p. 150.  
36 Ibid., the German word Wesen here is usually translated by the English word 
"essence," but since this latter term implies an ahistorical nature that persists beneath 
changing appearances, and since this is decidedly not what Heidegger means by it, 
I've translated it here with "manner of emergence" to more closely approximate 
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Heidegger's usage. I also variously render it as "manner of appearance." The word 
Wesen in Heidegger signifies the way in which a thing emerges into appearance and 
shows itself from out of itself in its own terms rather than in terms of a predetermined 
representation or theory of being.  
37 Heidegger 1954, p. 151; Heidegger 2001, p. 151.  
38 Young 2002. 
39 Shellenberger et. al. 2005. 
40 Heidegger 1954, pp. 151–2; Heidegger 2001, p. 151.  
41 Heidegger 1954, p. 28; Heidegger 2001, p. 42.  
42 Heidegger 1954, p. 31; Heidegger 2001, p. 45.  
43 Heidegger 2001, p. 69; Heidegger 1954, p. 57. 
44 Heidegger 2001, pp. 152-3; Heidegger 1954, p. 153.  
45 Ibid.  
46 Heidegger 1954, p. 154; Heidegger 2001, p. 154. 
47 Heidegger 1996, p. 97 ff. The German word here is Entfernung, which Stambaugh 
translates more literally but rather awkwardly as "de-distancing." I prefer the more 
readable but less literal "making near" (Heidegger also uses this formulation in 
German). The idea is that human existence recognizes something like remoteness and, 
in doing so, brings that remoteness near in a way. In my citations of Stambaugh's 
translation here I have replaced her "de-distancing" with "making near."  
48 Ibid., p. 98. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid., pp. 97–8. 
51 Heidegger 2001, pp. 156–7; Heidegger 1954, p. 157.  
52 The German word here is Zwischenraum, literally a "between-space." 
53 Heidegger 1954, p. 156; Heidegger 2001, p. 155.  
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid.  
56 Heidegger 2001, p. 170; Heidegger 1954, p. 168  
57 Heidegger 1954, p. 179; Heidegger 2001, p. 181.  
58 Heidegger 1954, p. 181; Heidegger 2001, p. 182.  
59 On the other hand, viewed within the context of the mathematical project which 
subsumes the ancient distinction between phusis and techne under the modernist 
conception of nature as natura (so much so that to "naturalize" now means to describe 
something in purely mechanistic terms), everything would be "explainable" in terms 
of the mechanisms giving rise to its production, whether those process be traditionally 
considered to be natural (as in the natural selection that produced the heron) or 
artifactual (as in the industrial production of the brooch, which in the end according to 
the evolutionary psychologist is also explainable in terms of natural selection that 
produced the heron). Thus in an important sense the nature/artifice distinction has 
already collapsed in the mathematical project, for which everything is explainable 
under the same "natural" processes. So whereas Vogel collapses the nature/artifice 
distinction on the side of artifice, the mathematical project had already collapsed it on 
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the side of "nature" (understood as mechanistically determined natura). Heidegger 
offers a third alternative.  
60 Heidegger 1954, p. 184; Heidegger 2001, p. 185.  
61 Ibid. 
62 Thus, even though J. Baird Callicott, for instance, wishes to valorize Aldo Leopold's 
criteria of "beauty and integrity" in the latter's "Land Ethic," he remains within the 
mathematical project when he asserts that "there can be no value apart from an 
evaluator, that all value is as it were in the eye of the beholder. The value that is 
attributed to the ecosystem, therefore, is humanly dependent . . ." (Callicott 1989, p. 
27; see also pp. 133ff.). From a Heideggerian perspective, the problem begins with the 
emphasis on value, which implies a valuing subject and thereby drags along with it the 
entire ontological horizon of objective presence. 
63 Heidegger 1954, p. 181; Heidegger 2001, p. 182.  
64 Heidegger 1954, p. 166; Heidegger 2001, p. 168. The corollary German concepts 
here are "ein Sichhervorbringen oder ein Hergestelltwerden." 
65 In this journal Michael Peters and Ruth Irwin have called attention to the 
importance of "ecopoetics in relation to the work of Martin Heidegger and his concept 
of dwelling," adopting a certain version of ecopoetics as an approach to nature with a 
view toward environmental sustainability (Peters and Irwin, 2002). They write, 
"Poetry is one of the best ways that people have to bring the Earthly into language. 
This does not occur through an apparent representation but through a truth factor that 
is irreducible to the calculus of science or governmentality. Poetry is not a-political 
but a principle of politics." (Ibid.) Though rightly refusing to separate poetry and 
politics, however, they do not give sufficient attention to the ontology of things. The 
approach I am suggesting does not neglect the latter and so does not advocate an 
"approach to nature," ecopoetic or otherwise, but rather a step back out of the 
mathematical project that allows things to be encountered, from which we can then 
return to that project while holding the nature/artifice duality in suspension.  
66 I am indebted to Gregory Schufreider for the suggestion that Heidegger's notion of 
the divinities (die Göttlichen) along with the "mortality" heard in the "mortals" might 
indicate the temporal horizon of world much as earth and sky indicate its spatial 
horizon. 
67 Heidegger 1954, p. 177; Heidegger 2001, p. 178.  
68 As Peters and Irwin point out, "But when it comes to the status of humanity in 
relation to other forms of life, Heidegger retains the prejudices of his times." (op. cit.) 
See also Agamben 2004; Krell 1992; Derrida 1989. 
69 Heidegger 1996, sections 47 and 49. 
70 Ibid. p. 246. Heidegger later retracted this statement in a marginal caveat: "If we are 
talking about human life—otherwise not—'world'." (Ibid.) 
71 Heidegger 1995, pp. 176 ff. 
72 Heidegger 1959, p. 45. 
73 Heidegger 1995, p. 266. 
74 Heidegger 1995, p. 273. 
75 das Enthemmende. 
76 Ibid., p. 273. "Essential disruption" translates the phrase wesenhafte Erschütterung. 
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77 Ibid. 
78 Agamben 2004, p. 67. 
79 Heidegger, "What is Metaphysics?" in Basic Writings (op.cit.), p. 99. 
80 Agamben 2004, p. 62. 
81 Ibid., p. 65. This is the crucial point overlooked by Peters and Irwin when they 
assert of animals as characterized in the 1929/30 lecture course, "The utter absorption 
in the lived environment (often called instinct) is a compulsion that excludes 
awareness and agency. Heidegger regards it as closed and captured by existence. 
[Human] Conduct, on the other hand, is the openness to the manifest experience of 
things in the 'Open of the world'." (op. cit.) What is at issue here is not "Being" but 
closedness, and it is this closedness that humanity shares with animals! Peters and 
Irwin come close to this observation when they immediately add that "on a larger 
scale Heidegger's notion of the epoch and the Enframing of technology is just such a 
finite and totalizing system and subsumes agency in a similar manner." (Ibid.)  
82 Krell 1992, pp. 9 ff. The words Benommenheit/benommen are translated as 
"captivation/captivated by" in the 1929/30 course and are variously translated in Being 
and Time as "numbness/benumbed," "be numbed by," and "taken in by" in 
Stambaugh's translation, and as "fascinated by" in the Macquarrie/Robinson 
translation.  
83 Ibid., p. 10.  
84 Agamben 2004, p. 70. Agamben is more interested in the further suggestion, outside 
the topic of this paper, that "the understanding of the human world is possible only 
through the experience of the 'closest proximity'—even if deceptive—to this exposure 
without disconcealment" (Ibid., p. 62), leading him to ultimately abandon the project 
of discovering the authentically human and replace it with one that attempts "to show 
the central emptiness, the hiatus that—within man—separates man and animal, and to 
risk ourselves in this emptiness: the suspension of the suspension, Shabbat of both 
animal and man." (Ibid., p. 92) These radically non-anthropocentric implications 
remain to be developed.  
85 The German word Schrein here also means "cabinet," and although it would 
certainly sound less grandiose to refer to the "cabinet of the nothing" it might be more 
appropriate given that animals too encounter it in some way.  
86 Agamben 2004, p. 70. 
87 E.g., in "The Thing" (Heidegger 1954: 177; Heidegger 2001: 179). Heidegger was 
more careful in his earlier attempts to address the relation between human existence 
and life—cf. Heidegger 1996:  pp. 22, 45, 154–5. For a more thorough discussion of 
the difficulties surrounding Heidegger's claim that an ontology of life is only 
accessible through a privative interpretation of the ontology of Dasein, see Krell (op. 
cit.).  
88 Agamben 2004, p. 91. 
89 Op. cit. 
90 Following suggestions by both John Llewellyn and Charles Bigger, we might best 
characterize this participation as a "middle voiced" phenomenon rather than relegating 
it to either the passive or active voices. Much as musical creation and dance happen 
by relinquishing the rigidity of control and "letting" it happen, and yet neither takes 
place without the participation of the musician or dancer, so also "letting things be 
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things" comes about only through a human involvement that lets it happen in the step 
back out of representational thinking and technical manipulation (see Llewellyn 1991 
and Bigger 2005). 
91 For a hard look at these meagre results in the United States and the lack of overall 
vision behind them, see Shellenberger and Nordhaus (op. cit.). 
